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1. Introduction 
In 2007 Sweden reported the highest labor force participation rate among females aged 25 to 
54 in the OECD – 87.1 %.
1 As a matter of fact, Sweden reached the 2007 OECD average 
level, which is 70.3 %, already in 1974. Thus, the gender composition of the labor force today 
in most OECD countries has more in common with the Swedish situation in the 1970’s than 
the present one. To study the Swedish transition from a country with modest to high female 
labour force participation rates is therefore a venture of substantial policy relevance. 
As can be seen from Figure 1, the rapid growth in female participation rates in Sweden 
during the post-war era was primarily driven by a surge in married women’s participation 
rates. In the mid 1980’s the gap between married and unmarried participation rates had 
virtually vanished.  One purported explanation to this unprecedented growth, alongside 
factors as technological change in home production and the expansion of the public sector, is 
the profound reforms in the area of family taxation. These culminated in the individual tax 
reform of 1971.  
As the 1971 reform radically increased net wages for a large number of married women 
it is often considered to have increased labour force participation of married women. 
However, it is a priori unclear if, or to what extent, the tax reform contributed to this 
development. As documented by Pencavel (1998a), employment-population ratios for married 
and unmarried women have converged also in the U.S. since the 1970’s in a system with joint 
family taxation. The impact from the structure of family taxation on Swedish female labour 
force participation has historically been analysed based on cross sectional evidence 
(Gustafsson 1992 and Gustafsson and Jacobsson 1985).
2 The widely held belief that the 1971 
tax reform increased female labor force participation has, however, still not been tested by the 
exogenous variation provided by the tax policy reform itself.  
                                                 
1 Labor force statistics for the OECD countries can be found at http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx . 
2 See Jaumotte (2003) for a recent overview of female labor supply in the OECD countries from the point of 




























Figure 1.  Labor force participation rates (annual averages in percent) of married and single women aged 25 to 
54 between 1963 and 1986. Source: Statistics Sweden, Labor Force Surveys.  
 
Undisputedly, the family tax reform provides a quasi-experimental situation: Before 
1971 the earnings of each spouse were added together and taxed according to a steeply 
progressive tax schedule. This meant that the average tax rate facing the housewife was a 
function of the ‘last-dollar’ marginal tax rate of her husband. After the reform, the link 
between the husband’s earned income and the wife’s average tax rate was in principle 
abolished. Accordingly, the 1971 reform affected work incentives of different wives 
differently depending on their husband’s pre-reform earnings. Wives married to husbands at 
the very top of the income distribution faced average tax rate cuts of a magnitude of 40 
percentage points whereas women married to lower-income husbands could face small 
increases. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact from the individual tax reform on 
female employment. The leading idea of the empirical model is to identify the change in the 
log net wage rate (evaluated at 30 weekly work hours) by the exogenous variation in average 
tax rates provided by the tax reform. To this end I will use longitudinal individual level data 
from the LINDA data base from two points in time: 1969, i.e. two years before the reform 
was launched but the year before it was announced, and 1975, four years after the reform.   4
Since the data contain tax register information on the spouse I will be able to test whether 
those who faced large exogenous increases in net wage rates (wives married to high-income 
men) were more prone to go from non-work to work than women whose first-dollar marginal 
tax rates did not fall (women married to low-income husbands).  
In the estimations I employ a linear probability model that allows for individual level 
fixed effects. I obtain a preferred estimate of the elasticity of the employment probability with 
respect to the net-of-tax share of 0.46. This estimate is of expected sign and is also 
statistically different from zero. I also find a statistically significant non-labour income 
elasticity of -0.14. The most central component of non-labor income is the net-of-tax earnings 
of the husband. However, these overall elasticity estimates conceal substantial heterogeneity 
between women with and without kids. In fact, women with kids both years exhibit a 
considerably higher net-of-tax share elasticity that is estimated to 1.77.  
When the overall estimates are used to simulate the effect of the tax reform it turns out 
that the 1971 individual tax reform presumably did have a profound impact on married 
women’s employment. The simulations suggest that employment among married women 
would have been 10 percentage points lower in 1975 if the 1969 statutory income tax system 
still would have been in place in 1975. Most of the reform effect operates through the effect 
on net wages. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a background to the paper 
while section 3 outlines the most important features of the tax system and the Swedish 
economic environment in 1969 and 1975. Section 4 discusses the empirical model and section 
5 deals with data issues and descriptive statistics. The estimation results are presented in 
section 6. Simulations of the impact of the reform are reported in section 7. Section 8 
concludes.  
   5
2. Background 
During the 1990’s it became increasingly popular to estimate labor supply by making use of 
exogenous policy reforms. To a large extent, this literature centered on various earned income 
tax credit policies. One common strategy has been to compare labor market outcomes of 
eligible and non-eligible to income tax credits with data from before and after a policy-reform 
(Eissa and Liebman 1996) or with data from several time periods (Francesconi and van der 
Klaauw 2007). A general lesson from this empirical literature, which has been summarized by 
Eissa and Hoynes (2005) for the U.S., is that the labor supply response of women appears to 
be concentrated along the extensive rather than the intensive margin.
3 These findings are 
coherent with results obtained in the traditional labor supply literature (Mroz 1987). 
There is also a minor quasi-experimental literature that focuses on the labour supply 
response of married women to income tax reforms. While adopting a difference-in-difference 
methodology, Eissa (1995,1996) studies the supply of labor of wives, both along the extensive 
and intensive margins. The strategy is to compare women married to husbands at the very top 
of the income distribution with women married to men who are located somewhat lower on 
the income distribution, groups that are treated differently by the tax reform. Eissa uses two 
U.S. tax reforms (ERTA81 and TRA86) as exogenous variation and repeated individual cross 
sections before and after the reforms. 
4 Recently, Crossley and Jeon (2007) have directly 
adopted the methodology of Eissa while studying a Canadian family tax reform of 1988.  
                                                 
3 Empirical research on Swedish data on labour supply responsiveness to income taxation has traditionally not 
been conducted in quasi-experimental settings. An exception is Klevmarken (2000), who utilizes the Swedish tax 
reform act of 1991 to study labor supply along the continuous margin among both males and females on a 
smaller panel data set (HUS). There are also recent examples (e.g. Hansson (2007) and Blomquist and Selin 
(2009)) on Swedish papers on the elasticity of taxable income. The responsiveness in taxable income can be 
viewed as a wider measure of labor supply. To some extent, the empirical strategy of this paper is related to 
those studies. 
4 The Eissa (1995,1996) papers have been discussed from various angles by Blundell et al (1998), Blundell and 
MaCurdy (1999),  Heckman (1996) and Liebman and Saez (2006). One concern that has been raised is that the 
assumption of constant group composition, which is needed for consistency of the difference-in-difference 
estimator, is likely to be violated when grouping is made based on the income of the husband before and after a 
large tax reform. Since tax reforms tend to affect both spouses it cannot be ruled out that the composition of 
income groups is altered in a non-random way due to a reform.   6
LaLumia (2008) instead sheds light on a move from separate to joint taxation in the U.S 
in 1948. Equipped with census data from 1940 and 1950, LaLumia exploits the institutional 
feature that some states applied joint taxation even before 1948. This allows her to perform 
difference-in-difference estimations, comparing labor supply outcomes of individuals in states 
with joint taxation both in 1940 and 1950 with individual outcomes in states that converted to 
joint taxation.  
In contrast to the above mentioned works this paper will not pursue an identification 
strategy that relies on group heterogeneity. There are at least two very good reasons for this. 
First, if grouping is based on the income of the primary earner, it is impossible to separate the 
net wage effect from a non-labour income effect. Second, as pointed at by Blundell and 
MaCurdy (1999), the ‘treatment’ that individuals typically obtain from income tax reforms is 
rarely dichotomous in nature. Conversely, different taxpayers are usually treated differently 
by an income tax reform, even within a certain tax bracket owing to the complexity of the 
income tax system. Apart from the federal tax bracket of the husband, the change in tax 
incentives more often than not depend on other parameters as the number of children, local 
tax rates and various deductions. In the Swedish case, these other sources of variation are 
important. Hence, in this paper I will employ an estimation strategy that exploits individual 
heterogeneity in tax rates and non-labor income as the identifying source of variation.  
3. Tax system and economic environment 
Federal income taxation was first established in 1902 in Sweden. The tax schedule was 
progressive in nature, rested on joint taxation of all sources of income, and the same schedule 
applied to married couples as well as to singles. In 1952, two separate federal schedules, one 
for couples and one for singles, were introduced.
5 The construction of these two schedules 
implied that, up to a certain limit, the total federal tax paid by two spouses equalled the tax 
                                                 
5 Single households with children were taxed according to the tax schedule for couples.    7
paid by two singles, where each single earns half of total family earnings. Hence, to some 
extent the system was a split system of the type that is currently in use in Germany.  
Optional separate taxation came into place in 1966, a law change that was motivated by 
concerns about married women’s labour force participation. This meant that filers could apply 
for being taxed according to the schedule for singles given that this minimised the total tax 
payments of the family. Around 5 percent of the population utilized this option, which only 
involved the federal tax payment and the pension insurance fee, not the local tax rates.
6 As 
displayed in Figure 2, the option implied that the pre-reform marginal tax rate fell at the point 
where it is was more beneficial for the family to choose separate taxation. The location of this 
point was of course a function of the husband’s income. 
Local tax rates were proportional and decided at the level of the parishes, municipalities 
and counties. Before the 1971 reform, local taxes paid the previous year was deductible 
against the assessed income at the federal level. Furthermore, prior to 1971 the marginal 
effects arising from the local and federal tax schedules could be mitigated by a deduction for 
work (‘förvärvsavdrag’). This could be claimed by all women with positive earnings. For 
married women without children the deduction was just a minor lump sum deduction. 
However, for married women with children below 16 in the household, the deduction was 
phased in as 25 percent of her earnings up to SEK 78,800, an earnings range where many 
married women were located in 1969.
7 This lowered her effective marginal tax rate in this 
range. The essential ingredients of the 1971 reform were: 
  The two separate tax schedules for couples and singles were replaced by a federal tax 
schedule common to all individuals regardless of marital status. For couples, labour 
incomes became taxed separately, whereas unearned income and wealth still were 
jointly taxed. 
                                                 
6 The pension insurance fee was levied on the federal taxable income progressively and was essentially a sort of 
‘federal’ income tax. 
7 Henceforth, all nominal values are expressed in the price level of 2006.   8
  The deduction for local taxes was abolished. Since local taxes prior to the reform were 
deducted against a progressive schedule this move substantially increased tax 
progressivity. 
 
Figure 2. Marginal tax rates generated by the statutory income tax system for different levels of assessed income 
in 1969 and 1975 in the interval SEK 0-SEK 600,000 for a wife with a husband with mean income, one child 
and mean local tax rate. Assessed income expressed in 2006 prices. See appendix A for a detailed description of 
the income tax system. 
 
  In order to compensate one-earner couples a spousal tax reduction was established 
after the reform. The tax of the primary earner was reduced by SEK 8,500 if the 
secondary earner had zero earnings. If the secondary earner earned no more than SEK 
21,150 the tax reduction was 40 percent of the difference between SEK 21,150 and the 
income of the secondary earner.  
  The deduction for work was retained, even though it became gender neutral: from now 
on it applied to the secondary earner of the household. It did, however, decrease in 
nominal terms. Accordingly, due to inflation the importance of the deduction declined 
even more in real terms. 
From inspection of the federal tax schedules in 1969 and 1975 (see appendix A) one might get 
the impression that tax rates went down in Sweden between 1969 and 1975. This is, however, 
a false picture since others taxes rose and the deduction for local taxes was repealed. The 
average local income tax rate increased from 20.24 percent in 1969 to 25.23 percent in 1975.   9
An important trend was also that a new emphasis was put on indirect taxation. The average 
pay-roll tax in the sample, levied on gross wages, rose from 9.4 percent to 24.0 percent in 
1975. An important source of finance of the individual tax reform in 1971 was also an 
increase in the value added tax (VAT). The VAT rate rose from 11.11 percent in 1969 to 
17.65 percent in 1975. 
The business cycle situation for the years 1969 and 1975 can be described as normal. 
The unemployment rate – the share of unemployed persons from all persons in the labour 
force -- for married women aged 25 to 54 was low both years – 1.6 percent in 1969 and 1.2 
percent in 1975. The labour force participation rate and employment-population ratio were 
quite close during this time period. Sweden exhibited extraordinary high GDP growth rates 
during the 1950’s and 1960’s, whereas a trend wise decrease can be discerned from 1970 and 
onwards. In 1969 the GDP growth rate was 5.5 percent; the corresponding figure for 1975 
was 2.6. In 1971, the same year as the individual tax reform, Sweden experienced a serious 
downturn, but the economy had recovered in 1975. 
 
4. Methodological  issues 
 
4.1 The model framework 
Throughout the analysis I make the standard assumption that the wife maximizes her utility 
while taking the husband’s earnings as given and as fully disposable for consumption and that 
the budget constraint binds. Let  f  denote ’female’ and m ’male’ ( m f j ,  ). The labor 
supply function of the wife can then be written as 
  S H w w g H m m f f   ˆ ,
*        ( 1 )  
where  j H  is hours of work, j w ˆ  is the net hourly wage rate and S is family unearned income. 
While the exogeneity assumption with respect to the husband’s work hours might not be valid   10
for all families it is certainly a more realistic description of family decision making in Sweden 
in the 1970’s than present.   
 
4.2 Empirical model 
Following a large body of works on female labor force participation (e.g. Eissa and Hoynes 
2004) I will assume that the work decision is a function of the average tax rate at a fixed hours 
choice. The following semi-log participation equation serves as a point of departure
8: 
  it i t it it it
A
it it e X a R a w a a P            3 2 1 0 ) 1 ( ln    (2) 
where  it P  is the probability to be in the labour force for individual i at year t.  
A
it   is the 
average tax rate at the fixed hours choice,  it w  the gross wage rate,  it R  is non-labor income, 
it X  is a vector of sociodemographic characteristics,  t   is a time fixed effect,  i   is an 
individual level fixed effect and  it e , finally, is the idiosyncratic error term. The linear 
probability model has been chosen so that individual fixed effects can be accommodated in 
the regression framework. Indeed, consistent estimation of the relevant marginal effects 
would not have been feasible in a non-linear model such as logit or probit due to the 
incidental parameter problem.
9 
A well-known methodological problem when estimating the discrete labour supply 
margin is that market wages are unobservable for non-participants.
10 In what follows, I will 
address this problem by assuming that the log hourly wage rate is given by a linear function 
                                                 
8 Semi-log labor supply equations have been used extensively in empirical work. See Heim (2007) for a recent 
example. 
9 Nothing indicates that the use of the linear probability model (LPM) per se is critical for the results. The 
marginal effects obtained by the LPM model are very similar to those obtained by logit and probit in a 
specification where data are pooled without fixed effects. However, it will become apparent in section 6 that the 
results will differ across specifications with and without fixed effects. 
10 Unfortunately, in the register data that I use there is no information on hourly wage rates for those working 
either.    11
of a vector of individual characteristics,  it Z  (including age, region and educational status), 
time fixed effects,  t  , individual level fixed effects,  i  , and an error term,  it u , such that  
it i t it it u Z b b w        1 0 ln      (3) 
Combining (2) and (3) yields  
it i t it it it
A
it it Z X R P                   4 3 2 1 0 ) 1 ln(    (4) 
where  0 1 0 0 b a a    ,  1 1 a   ,  2 2 a   ,  3 3 a   ,  1 1 4 b a   ,  t t t a    1   ,  i i i a    1    
and  it it it u a e 1    . Note that the leading idea of the empirical model is to identify variation 
in net hourly wage rates by the exogenous variation in average net-of-tax shares provided by 
the 1971 income tax reform. The empirical strategy is in the spirit of a difference-in-
difference model: I compare pre-reform and post-reform employment outcomes for those who 
faced relatively large and relatively small increases in the log of the net-of-tax share, 
) 1 ln(
A
it   , while controlling for a common time trend and a set of observable characteristics.  
The key exclusion restriction when estimating (4) is that  0 3 2   b b  in the equation 
it i it
A
it it it u R b b Z b b w          3 2 1 0 ) 1 ln( ln . This, for instance, rules out any general 
equilibrium effects from the tax reform on wages, which would introduce a correlation 
between the key regressors and  it  . The foremost advantage of the approach chosen here, as 
opposed to imputing wage rates, is that the imputation method typically relies on more 
controversial exclusion restrictions. To be able to identify the hourly wage rate in the main 
equation, it is often assumed that the education variables determine labour supply only trough 
the hourly wage rate.  
An important feature of (4), which typically has been absent in related studies 
conducted on repeated cross sections (Eissa (1995,1996), Crossley and Jeon (2007) and 
LaLumia (2008)), is the individual level fixed effect  i  . Remember that the pre-reform level 
of average tax rates is a function of the income of the husband. How spousal characteristics   12
relate to each other has been analysed both theoretically and empirically in a substantial 
literature on marriage and assortative mating.
11 In my sample it is visible that women married 
to high-income and low-income men are highly heterogeneous with respect to observable 
characteristics like educational attainment.  It would therefore be a very strong assumption to 
posit that women married to low-income and high-income men would not differ in relevant 
unobserved characteristics (e.g. tastes for work) as well. 
 
4.3  Key independent variables  
To arrive at appropriate exogenous measures of net-of-tax shares I make use of available 
information on the wage and hours distributions for the relevant time period. Since median 
work hours for Swedish married women belonging to the labor force was 30 hours a week 
both before and after the reform I set the fixed hours choice to 30 hours a week, which 
corresponds to 1,560 yearly work hours.
12 Alternative fixed hours choices will be considered 
in a sensitivity analysis. Gross hourly wage rates have been imputed based on variables on 
age, region and education. Since there is no data on wages in LINDA covering the relevant 
time period I have consulted an auxiliary data source – the Swedish Level of Living Survey.
13  
The average net-of-tax share,  ) 1 (
A
it   , is defined in the following way: 
 
) 1 )( 1 (









h w Q h w T
 

       ( 5 )  
                                                 
11 See e.g. Pencavel (1998b). 
12 Information on work hours and hourly wage rates has been taken from the 1968 and 1974 waves of the 
Swedish Level of Living Survey. The distributions of work hours for married women for 1968 and 1974 are 
reported in Appendix B. 
13  I assume that  it it it v B w    1 0 ln   , where  it B  comprises variables for educational status, age and 
dummies for each county that are present both in the LINDA data set and in the Swedish Level of Living Survey. 
To account for time heterogeneity in the returns to education and regional demand conditions I estimate the two 
years separately. The wage variable is then inflated to the wage level for the relevant year by a wage index. To 
account for unobserved differences between non-worker and workers I have also estimated two-step Heckman 
selection models, but the selection term turned out to be of minor importance both years and was excluded from 
the imputation procedure. Following Eissa and Hoynes (2004) I identified the selection term with the variables 
for the number of kids in the household.   13
where ) (  T is the income tax function, Qis the husband’s earnings, 
imp w is the imputed gross 
wage rate,  30 h  is the amount of yearly work hours that correspond to 30 weekly work hours, 
m  is the level of the value added tax (VAT) and  p is the average pay-roll tax. The gross 
wage rate is net of pay-roll taxes. The essence of the family tax reform was that the pre-
reform tax function had the form    Q h w T
imp reform pre  

30   whereas the post-reform 
counterpart had the structure      Q h w T m
imp
f
reform post    

30 . 










) ; 0 (
     ( 6 )  
Thus, the main component of non-labour income is the earnings of the husband minus the tax 
payments given that the wife works zero hours. TRANSFERS include child allowances and 
housing allowances. These were both non-taxable transfers.
14 It should be emphasized that I 
have excluded both positive and negative capital income from Q. The reason is that the main 
bulk of both positive and negative unearned income relates to investments in owner-occupied 
housing. To a substantial degree, housing investment decisions and work decisions are 
determined simultaneously. Therefore, capital income is exluded from Q. This endogeneity 
problem was also noted by Gustafsson and Jacobsson (1985) who excluded deductions from 





                                                 
14 These transfers have been computed based on the socio-demographic characteristics in the censuses. See 
Appendix A for a description. 
15 When positive and negative capital income is added to Q considerably higher non-labor income elasticities 
are obtained in the main specification.  However, it is impossible to give these elasticity estimates a causal 
interpretation since the variation in non-labor income is then driven by endogenous investments in housing. If 
one instead exploits the non-labor income measure defined by (6) as an instrument for the endogenous non-labor 
income regressor one obtains IV regression results that are close to the estimates from the OLS regressions 
reported below in Table 1.    14
4.4 Control variables 
Needless to say, the labor supply decision is of course affected by the number of children in 
the household. Therefore, I include the number of pre-school children (0-6 years of age) and 
the number of school children (7-15 years of age) in the household.
16 
One factor that undeniably had consequences for the costs of working was the rapid 
expansion of publicly provided and heavily subsidized day care facilities in Sweden, an 
expansion that was carried out at the level of municipalities. From April 1 1971 to April 1 
1976 the share of pre-school children that was enrolled in subsidized day care increased from 
10 percent to almost 20 percent. But the variation in levels and in changes between 
municipalities was large. Under the assumption that each individual woman is atomistic and 
does not affect the total provision of day care in the municipality I will include a regressor for 
the local day care density in the regressions to account for this variation.
17 This variable 
measures the share of the number of pre-school children in the municipality that was enrolled 
in subsidized day care. Since day care also played a role as a crucial employer for women this 
variable surely also picks up a demand effect. Therefore, I also interact this share with the 
number of pre-school children. 
I also include two dummy variables for education that are time-invariant. Their effect 
on labour supply might, however, be non-constant through time owing to changes in the wage 
structure and other factors. Thus, I let the educational dummies interact with the time dummy 





                                                 
16 Since the census information for the pre-reform year is from 1970, not from 1969, there is some measurement 
error in the variables for the number of children.  
17 The time points of measurement were April 1 1971 and April 1 1976.    15
5. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
5.1 The data source 
The primary data source for this work is LINDA (Longitudinal INdividual DAta), which is a 
representative sample of about 3.35 percent of the Swedish population (Edin and Fredriksson 
2000).  LINDA builds on information from various administrative registers. This paper 
primarily utilises LINDA data from two kinds of registers: tax registers and the population 
and housing censuses (‘Folk och bostadsräkningarna’). I will use census data from 1970 and 
1975 merged with tax register data from 1969 and 1975. Of outmost importance is that the 
data also contains tax register information about the spouse of the sampled individual.
18 The 
employment variable, i.e. the dependent variable in the regressions, is defined from declared 
earnings and equals one if the wife had positive earnings and is zero otherwise. 
19 Thus, the 
dependent variable can be viewed as a measure of whether the female was legally employed 
at some point in time during the tax year.  
Even though the census information on demographic variables relates to 1970 I 
nonetheless choose to use 1969 as the pre-reform point of measurement.
 20 The reason to this 
choice is two-folded. First, for some unclear reason data for a large number of spouses, who 
were married to women who did not file their income tax return, are missing in 1970. Still, 
data of this kind is available for surrounding years. Second, the reform was announced in the 
                                                 
18 Even though non-married cohabiting couples with common children were treated as married couples for tax 
purposes I will only include married women in the study. This has been necessary since partners to cohabiting 
sampled individuals have not been included in the source data set.  
19 Since unearned income not exceeding SEK 1000 in 1969 and SEK 2000 in 1975 was classified as earned 
income I have required earnings to exceed these limits. The key elasticity estimates in this paper only change 
slightly if one instead requires earnings to be positive without any restrictions. Moreover, there are other caveats 
associated with data from administrative registers. In 1974 unemployment benefits and sickness benefits became 
taxable. Fortunately, from 1974 and onwards LINDA includes information from the register of income 
statements about the level of these benefits. Thus, in order to obtain a constant earnings measure I have 
subtracted these social benefits from the 1975 earnings measure. 
20 While data from tax registers are available annually from 1968 and onwards, the censuses were only 
conducted every fifth year. The latter were based on questionnaires that all Swedish residents were required by 
law to fill in and return to the authorities. As a consequence, the response rates were extremely high. See SCB 
(1974, 1979, brief English summaries are included) for detailed descriptions of the censuses.   16
spring of 1970 (Elvander 1972). In fact, monthly averages of married women’s employment 
from the official Labor force surveys in 1970 show that employment increased much more 
rapidly during the autumn than during the spring. Thus, data from 1970 could potentially 
entail anticipatory responses to the 1971 reform that would bias the results.
21   
It is standard in the labor supply literature to limit the population of interest to prime-
aged individuals. Here I adopt this convention and accordingly only include married women 
aged 25 to 54. Since the estimation technique requires that individual observations appear 
twice, both 1969 and 1975, the sample for 1969 consists of individuals aged 25 to 48. I 
exclude women who received farm income or income from self-employment or who were 
married to a spouse who earned income from any of these sources. This is because special tax 
rules applied to these groups. I also deleted around 450 observations that lacked data on 
education level. In addition, I restrict the sample to those wives whose husbands had positive 
earnings and positive federal taxable income in both years.
22 The enumerated requirements 
are fulfilled by 20,478 women.  
Finally, wives married to husbands with a taxable income in the lowest bracket will be 
left out from the estimation sample. The motivation is that a non-negligible fraction of these 
households reside there for transitory reasons. In the presence of considerable mean reversion 
in husband’s income, the tax incentive of the wife is also highly transitory in nature. The 
problem is amplified by the fact that social benefits were taxable in 1975 but non-taxable in 
1969. This implies that the spousal income of those at the bottom of the taxable earnings 
distribution is measured with error.
23  After this exclusion, 18,069 married women remains. 
                                                 
21 Unfortunately, the data problems for 1970 described above prohibit any assessment of whether or not there 
was a discontinuity in the change in employment status in 1971 among the “treated” wives.  
22The budget constraints for households where no one of the spouses works are not possible to observe. Many of 
these households are not obliged to file tax returns and could potentially rely on various sorts of assistance that 
are not visible in my data. 
23 To get an idea of the magnitude of this measurement problem I subtracted social benefits (unemployment and 
sickness benefits) from taxable earnings in 1975 and created deciles based on this adjusted taxable earnings 
measure, which is comparable with the statutory one in 1969. I then viewed the fraction of social benefits to the 
adjusted taxable earnings measure in 1975 by deciles. The summary statistics were striking: the ratio of mean   17
5.2 A look at the data 
Figure 3 plots the wife’s average tax rate against the earned income of the husband in 1969 
and 1975. It is easy to see that the average tax rate is an increasing function of the husbands’ 
earnings in 1969, whereas the two variables do not exhibit any correlation in 1975. One may 
also discern that there are to two clusters of observations in 1969: One group faces average 
tax rates that are less increasing in the earned income of the husband. This group consists of 
women with kids. As described in section 3, these were entitled to a more generous deduction 
for work than women without kids. There is also a substantial cross sectional variation in tax 
rates that originates from differences in local tax rates in both years.  
Figure 4 visualizes average employment status by decile for the two years.  Deciles are 
defined based on the taxable income of the husband in 1969. We can infer that there was a 
dramatic increase in married women’s employment in the higher deciles, especially in the 10
th 
decile. Obviously, there was also a marked increase in the 1
st decile. It cannot be excluded 
                                                                                                                                                          
social benefits to mean adjusted earnings was 0.36 in the first decile, 0.06 in the second decile and 0.005 in the 
top decile. Hence, as these benefits were available but not taxable in 1969 it is very likely that non-labor income 































0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000






































0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
Earned income of the husband
1975
 
Figure 3. Average tax rates, generated by the statutory income tax system, at 30 weekly work hours against 
earned income of the husband. Earned income is in SEK and in the price level of 2006. 
 
 
that the low level of female employment in the 1
st decile in 1969 is related to the demand side 
of the economy. Despite the fact that overall unemployment rate was low (1.6 percent) for 
married females aged 25-54 in 1969 it was somewhat higher (2.2 percent) in the age category 
25-34. Owing to the typical life-cycle earnings profile younger families tend to be placed in 
the lowermost deciles.  
It is also illuminating to examine wives with and without kids separately. To this end I 
have created two subsamples. First, I have extracted those wives who had kids in the 
household both years. Second, I have constructed a subsample of those wives who did not 
have kids in the household any of the two years. From Figure 5 we acknowledge that there 
was much more action going on in the sample with kids, where the mean level of employment   19
status rose from 0.54 in 1969 to 0.76 in 1975. The corresponding statistics for the sample 
without kids are 0.80 and 0.82 respectively.  
 
 
Figure 4. Average female employment status by decile, where deciles are based on taxable income of the 
husband in 1969.  
 
 
Figure 5. Average female employment status in 1969 and 1975 for different categories in the sample. 
 
The evolution of non-labour income between the two years is of course also a central 
part of the story. From Figure 6 it is visible that non-labor income decreased dramatically in 
the upper deciles between the two years. To obtain a view on to what extent the changes in 
the income tax system mechanically is responsible for this trend I recomputed then non-labor 
income variable for 1975 while assuming that the husband’s earned income in 1975 was taxed   20
according to the 1969 income tax laws.
24 As can be seen from Figure 6, when holding the 
1969 income tax system fixed between the two years the relatively slower non-labor income 
growth in the upper deciles is less dramatic. Still, the growth is relatively faster at the bottom 
part of the income distribution. This phenomenon can be ascribed to a general compression of 
the wage structure, which earlier has been documented elsewhere by, for instance, Edin and 
Holmlund (1995). The sharp increase in income tax payments in upper deciles is mainly due 
to the abolishment of the deduction for local taxes paid the previous year. 
 
 
Figure 6. The change in non-labor income between 1969 and 1975. The definition of non-labor income follows 
from equation (6) and the unit of measurement is thousands of SEK in the price level of 2006. 
 
 
6. Regression results 
6.1 Baseline results  
The baseline specification follows from equation (4) and the baseline results are reported in 
the first column of Table 1. When evaluated at the sample mean, the elasticity of the 
                                                 
24 The procedure here is identical to the one employed in the simulations presented in section 7. I have deflated 
the husband’s earnings for 1975 according to a wage index and then taxed this deflated income measure 
according the 1969 tax laws. Thereafter, I have inflated spousal net-of-tax earnings with the same wage index. 
(Since there is no general index for wages in these years I have used the wage index for ‘Average hourly 
earnings of adult workers in various branches of mining and manufacturing etc.: Women’. See Statistical 
yearbook 1972: table 258 and Statistical yearbook 1978: table 280.) Also, I have assumed that the husband takes 
the deduction for local taxes paid the previous year in 1969 as given.    21
participation probability with respect the net-of-tax share is estimated to be 0.46. 
25 Even 
though comparisons with traditional labor supply estimates must be done with great care, the 
“net-wage” elasticity is of expected sign and in the range of previously estimated female wage 
elasticities on Swedish data.
26 Moreover, the net-of-tax share elasticity is by far significantly 
different from zero at a level of 1 percent and precisely estimated. It is also interesting that a 
non-negligible non-labor income elasticity is detected: the non-labor income elasticity is 
estimated to be -0.14. This is the sign to be expected – when income in the state of non-work 
increases the employment probability should decrease. One should notice that also the non-
labor income elasticity is estimated to be significantly different from zero at a level of 1 
percent.    
In column (2) and (3) the fixed-effects model is compared to the corresponding 
random-effects model (column 2) and pooled OLS-model (column 3). In the alternative 
models both key elasticities are estimated to be larger in absolute terms when compared to the 
fixed-effects case. Note that if the tax reform would have been purely exogenous, i.e. if the 
variation in the net-of-tax share would have been random and uncorrelated to unobserved 
individual heterogeneity, pooled estimation, fixed-effects estimation and random-effects 
estimation would all yield consistent estimates, but the latter the most efficient ones. Here a 
Hausman test forcefully rejects the joint hypothesis that the coefficient estimates for the log 
net-of-tax share and non-labour income are equal in column 1 and 2.
27 This clearly indicates 
that the inclusion of fixed effects in equation (4) is of importance to the regression results.     
                                                 








 , where P  is 
average employment status in the sample. The non-labor income elasticity is given by 
P
R
R 2    , where R  
is the sample mean level of non-labor income.  
26 When evaluating labor supply elasticities at the mean values of the sample of married women Blomquist and 
Hansson-Brusewitz (1990) obtain hours elasticities ranging from 0.34 to 0.75 in a non-linear Tobit estimation 
framework.  
27 To account for heteroskedasticity I implemented the procedure suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p. 291), i.e. I 
performed a regression based Hausman test with a robust Wald statistic.    22
In line with our prior expectations, the number of pre-school kids in the household 
strongly reduces the probability to be employed, although at a decreasing rate. The negative 
effect from kids in school age is, however, considerably smaller. In the main specification 
(column 1), the coefficient for the control variable for the local day care density is positive, as 
expected, and significant, whereas the coefficient for the interaction between day care density 
and the number of pre-school children is insignificant.  
As explained above, the interactions between the year dummy for 1975 and the age, 
education and region variables are included in order to control in a flexible way for time 
trends related to these variables. The negative coefficient for the interaction between the time 
dummy for 1975 and the dummy for more than 9 years of schooling makes sense since this 
period saw a decline in the returns to education (Edin and Holmlund 1995).  
 
6.2 Heterogeneous response  
Previous works on female labour supply to taxation in Sweden has typically been conducted 
on smaller survey data sets. And as far as I know, the Swedish literature has so far been silent 
on the issue whether there are heterogeneous responses among married women with and 
without children. Table 2 reveals that the overall response reported in Table 1 undeniably 
masks substantial heterogeneity between wives with and without kids. The selection of the 
two subsamples was described in section 5. Indeed, women with kids exhibit a noticeably 
higher net-of-tax share elasticity -- 1.77 which can be compared with 0.36 for women without 
kids.
28 Interestingly, none of the subsamples responds in a significant way to the changes in 
non-labor income between the two years. 
From  Figure 5 we have already seen that the pre-reform level of employment was 
considerably lower among women with kids both years. The diverging sizes of the elasticity 
                                                 
28 These elasticities are evaluated at sample means for each subsample. When elasticities are evaluated at the 
overall sample mean the elasticity for women with kids is 1.60 and the elasticity for women without kids is 0.41.    23
estimates for the two groups presumably relates to taste differences between the groups that 
also might help explain why employment was so low among females with kids in 1969.  
 
6.3 Sensitivity analysis  
In this paper I have approximated the relevant budget constraint of the individual with her 
average tax rate at a certain level of predicted earnings. As explained in section 4, in the main 
specification I arrive at this level of earnings by imputing hourly wage rates and by setting the 
amount of weekly work hours to 30, which was the median level of weekly work hours both 
in 1968 and 1974. One might wonder though what happens if one instead uses 40 weekly 
work hours, the mode value both years (conditional on positive hours). 40 hours also 
correspond to full-time work. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that the estimated net-of-tax share 
elasticity then increases to 0.58 (from 0.47), while the estimate of the non-labor income 
elasticity only slightly changes. According to the hours distributions reported in Appendix B, 
a third natural point for evaluating a fixed hours choice is 20 hours a week. As can be seen 
from column 2 the estimated net-of-tax share elasticity then falls to 0.29. The non-labor 
income elasticity is estimated to be -0.13. In similarity with Eissa and Hoynes (2004) who 
analyzed U.S. data with related techniques I also find a difference in “net wage elasticities” 






                                                 
29 In this case, an explanation to the observed pattern in estimated net-of-tax share elasticities is that the change 
in log net-of-tax shares between the two years was larger at the top of the income distribution when evaluated at 
20 hours. Clearly, this phenomenon relates to the optional separate tax system that was in place in 1969. As can 
be seen from Figure 2, when the earnings of the wife exceeded a certain threshold a separate tax schedule 
applied.  To some degree, this equalized tax payments among wives married to low- and high income husband 
and thereby reduced variation in pre-reform tax rates at higher levels of the earnings of the wife. (See also Table 
C.1 of Appendix C).   24
Table 1. Baseline Regression Results. Linear Probability Model. 
Dependent Variable: Employment Status
 
 Fixed-effects  Random-effects  Pooled  OLS 
Log average net-of-tax share  0.333  0.482  0.599 
 (0.033)***  (0.031)***  (0.035)*** 
      
 Implied elasticity      0.463  0.671  0.833 
 (0.046)***  (0.043)***  (0.049)*** 
      
Non-labor income  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
      
Implied elasticity      -0.143     -0.286  -0.298 
 (0.029)***  (0.020)***  (0.019)*** 
      
# Pre-school children  -0.280  -0.300  -0.308 
 (0.017)***  (0.012)***  (0.013)*** 
      
# Pre-school children squared  0.040  0.044  0.046 
 (0.006)***  (0.005)***  (0.005)*** 
      
# School children  -0.055  -0.063  -0.067 
 (0.006)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)*** 
      
Local day care density  0.001  0.002  0.002 
 (0.001)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
      
Local day care density  *  0.001  0.001  0.002 
# pre-school children  (0.001)  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
      
Time dummy   0.016  0.013  0.011 
* AGE in 1975  (0.008)**  (0.007)*  (0.008) 
      
Time dummy  * -0.025  -0.018  -0.017 
(
2 AGE )/100  (0.009)*** (0.008)**  (0.011) 
      
Time dummy *  -0.005  -0.015  -0.018 
9 years of schooling  (0.008)  (0.008)*  (0.010)* 
      
Time dummy *  -0.031  -0.055  -0.062 
More than 9 years of schooling  (0.014)**  (0.014)***  (0.017)*** 
      
Time dummy * County   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Dummies      
Time dummy for 1975  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
# cross sectional obs.  18069   18069  18069 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%,  ** significance at 5% and *** 
significance at 1%. Standard errors for elasticities have been obtained by the delta method. Elasticities are 
evaluated at sample means. The specifications reported in column 2 and 3 also include variables for age, age 
squared, 9 years of schooling, more than 9 years of schooling and a set of region dummies. 
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Table 2. Regression Results for a Linear Probability Fixed-Effects Model 
Dependent Variable: Employment Status 
  Women with children both 
years 
Women without children both 
years 
    
Log average net-of-tax share  1.152  0.294 
 (0.068)***  (0.058)*** 
    
 Implied elasticity      1.769    0.362    
 (0.104)***  (0.071)*** 
    
Non-labor income  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
    
Implied elasticity      -0.010    -0.069   
 (0.045)  (0.057) 
    
# cross sectional observations  10321  4197 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%,  ** significance at 5% and *** 
significance at 1%. Standard errors for elasticities have been obtained by the delta method. Elasticities are 
evaluated at the sample means for each subsample. All specifications include the full set of control variables. 
 
Another concern that can be raised is that the employment definition used in the 
analysis is too generous. As explained in section 5.1 I have treated all wives who reported 
earnings exceeding a small amount as employed. As a consequence, the aggregate 
employment rate in my sample exceeds the employment-population ratios and labor force 
participation figures that earlier have been reported in the Labor Force Surveys. As a 
robustness check, I have therefore constructed an alternative employment measure. Following 
Edin and Fredriksson (2000) I have treated a wife as employed given that she reports annual 
earnings exceeding one price base amount. With this new definition, average employment 
status in the sample falls from 0.65 to 0.48 in 1969 and from 0.79 to 0.71 in 1975. However, 
as can be inferred from column 3 this redefinition does not bring about any drastic 
consequences for the elasticity estimates. The estimated net-of-tax share elasticity is now 0.41 
instead of 0.47 and the non-labour income elasticity is estimated to be -0.12 instead of -0.14. 
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Table 3. Sensitivity analysis 
Dependent variable: Employment status.  
  (1) (2)  (3) 
  40 weekly hours  20 weekly hours  Alternative 
employment 
definition 
      
Log average net-of-tax   0.418  0.211  0.297 
share (0.042)***  (0.026)***  (0.036)*** 
      
Implied elasticity      0.581  0.293  0.413    
 (0.059)***  (0.037)***  (0.050)*** 
      
Non-labor income  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
      
Implied elasticity      -0.148  -0.156  -0.119     
 (0.029)***  (0.030)***  (0.030)*** 
      
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%,  ** significance at 5% and *** 
significance at 1%. Standard errors for elasticities have been obtained by the delta method. Elasticities are 
evaluated at the sample means. The number of cross sectional observations is 18,069. All specifications include 




7. Simulating the reform effect 
 
To assess the effect of the 1971 individual tax reform I have simulated average employment 
status in 1975 given that the tax system of 1969 was in place in 1975. I have assumed that the 
evolution of all other variables – including gross earnings of the husband -- was unaffected by 
the tax reform. The idea is to compare the simulated level of employment in 1975 with the 
actual level that year.
30 The difference between the two levels of employment is interpreted as 
a reform effect, even though this should be done with severe caution given the assumptions 
involved.  
In general, the tax reform influences labour supply through two channels. First, it 
affects the net wage through the average tax rate. Second, it has an effect on non-labour 
                                                 
30 It is a well known problem with the linear probability model that it generates predictions outside the feasible 
range. When plugging in the actual values of the independent variables, my main specification gives 2 
predictions outside the feasible range in 1969 and 7 predictions of this kind in 1975. Since the mean value of the 
fixed effects have been normalized to zero in the estimations, the mean value of the predictions for each year 
equals the actual mean value of employment status.   27
income through the net-of-tax earnings of the spouse. To begin with, in simulation 1a reported 
in Table 4, I solely focus on the statutory income tax system (that does not include indirect 
taxes) and the effect that operates through the net-of-tax share. This exercise suggests that 
average employment status in the sample would have been 0.71 in 1975 if the 1969 net-of-tax 
share implied by the 1969 statutory income tax system would have been in place in 1975. The 
estimate of the average reform effect is 0.08, an estimate that is significantly different from 
zero at a level of 1 percent.
31 The reform effect is further amplified if one considers the effect 
that works through non-labor income. Remember from Figure 5 that tax progressivity 
increased between the two years, mostly due to the abolishment of the deduction for local 
taxes, and that the real level of non-labor income went down. The reform effect is now 












                                                 














i P  is the value of the prediction 
when evaluated at the actual levels of all the independent variables, whereas 
simulated
i P  is the value of the 
prediction when evaluated at the simulated levels of the log net-of-share and non-labor income and the actual 
values of all the other regressors.  069 , 18  N .   28




mean  level  in 
1975 
Simulated mean 
level  in 1975 
Mean difference 
      
1. Keeping the statutory income tax 





(a) simulated net-of-tax share only   0.791  0.710  0.081 
 (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.008)*** 
      
(b) simulated net-of-tax share and non-   0.791  0.693  0.098 
labor income  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.008)*** 
      
2. Keeping the complete tax and transfer 
system fixed at the 1969 level 
 
    
(a) simulated  net-of-tax share only  0.791  0.755  0.036 
 (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)*** 
      
(b) simulated  net-of-tax share and non-  0.791  0.721  0.070 
labor income  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.007)*** 
      
The simulations are based on the baseline specification reported in column 1 of Table 1. Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors for the predictions have been obtained by the delta method. In the third 
column * denotes significance at 10%,  ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%.  
 
I have also performed simulations where I have kept the whole 1969 tax and transfer 
system constant through 1975. In addition to the statutory income tax, the tax and transfer 
system also includes pay-roll taxes, VAT, child allowances and housing allowances. 
Throughout, I have assumed that the burden of pay-roll and VAT taxation is fully borne by 
the individual. As outlined in section 3, indirect taxes sharply increased between 1969 and 
1975. As can be seen from simulation 2a, the positive effect from the introduction of separate 
taxation was probably to some extent offset by the surge in indirect taxes. Indeed, when 
keeping the whole tax and transfer system at the 1969 level and only simulating the net-of-tax 
share, the reform effect is considerably smaller, namely 0.04. On the other hand, the increase 
in indirect taxes pushes down non-labour income as well. This has a positive impact on 
female employment. Thus, when both the net-of-tax share and non-labor income are 
simulated (simulation 2b) the reform effect is estimated to be 0.07. 
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8. Concluding discussion  
 
In this paper I have utilized the quasi-experimental nature of the 1971 Swedish individual tax 
reform in combination with a rich panel data source to assess the impact from the reform 
along the extensive margin. Crucially, the panel structure of the data has allowed me to 
address issues of unobserved heterogeneity. In a first step I estimated employment elasticities. 
The overall net-of-tax share elasticity was estimated to be 0.46 and the non-labour income 
elasticity was -0.14. However, I also found that the net-of-tax share elasticity was 
considerably higher among women who had kids in both years. For this group I estimated a 
net-of-tax share elasticity of 1.77. In a second step I exploited the overall estimates to assess 
the impact of the reform. The results indicated that female employment would have been 
approximately 10 percentage points lower if the 1969 statutory income tax system, which to a 
large part rested on joint taxation, would have been in place in 1975. These estimates point at 
that the reform effect was substantial and that most of it operated through the increase in net 
wages.   
Since long it has been recognized that the structure of the income tax system appears to 
be an important determinant of married women’s labor force participation. In fact, the main 
motive for the individual tax reform of 1971 was to promote female labour force 
participation. Numerous papers have set out to explain the impact from the family tax system 
on female labor supply based on cross sectional data.
32  In contrast to this earlier literature, 
this paper instead directly exploits a family tax reform in Sweden that occurred in a historical 
situation when Swedish female labor market participation was close to today’s OECD 
average.  
                                                 
32 These include Smith et. al. (2003). More structural approaches to the same research question have recently 
been adopted by Callan et al (2007) and Steiner and Wrohlich (2008).   30
It has become one of the main political priorities for policy makers world-wide to 
enhance female labor force participation. Jaumotte (2003) has shown that there is a cross-
country correlation between the average tax rate facing the secondary earner in the household 
and the female participation rate in the OECD. Needless to say, the exact magnitude of the 
simulation results in this paper should be interpreted with caution. However, the results in this 
study nonetheless indicate that that the Swedish family tax reform did make a difference and 
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Appendix A . Tax and benefit calculations. 
 
A.1 Tax calculations 
The statutory tax schedules for 1969 and 1975, respectively, are depicted in Table A.1.  Other 
features of the income tax system, which all have been taken into account are summarised in 
Table A.2. Even though the register data owe a very high degree of accuracy there are some 
shortcomings. Also, some simplifying assumptions have been made in the tax calculations.  
Even though the formal tax rules were gender neutral in 1975, I have assumed that the wife is 
the secondary earner of the household in 1975. Another simplification in the tax calculations 
is that the sickness insurance fee for 1969 has been computed for national averages, even 
though some local variation prevailed.  
 
Table A.1 ‘Federal’ Tax Schedules in 1969 and 1975 
1969  1975 
Couples  Singles All tax payers 
Upper limit  Marginal tax 
rate 
Upper limit  Marginal tax 
rate 
Upper limit  Marginal tax 
rate 
88044 15 44022 15 70230  7 
117392 20  58696  20 93640  12 
146740 27  73370  27 117050 17 
176088 32 110055 32 140460 22 
220110 39 146740 36 187280 28 
293480 42 183425 41 210690 33 
440220 48 220110 45 304330 38 
733700 54 293480 44 327740 43 
1100550  59 440220 49 468200 48 
  65 733700 54 702300 52 
   1100550  59    56 
    65    
The tax schedules for 1969 include the mandatory pension insurance fee. Segments are expressed in taxable 
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Table A.2. Features of the Income Tax System in 1969 and 1975 
 1969  1975 
    
Joint taxation of  
earned income 
Optional. No. 
    
Joint taxation of 
asset income 
Yes, not affected by optional separate 
taxation. 
Yes, asset income was taxed at the 
primary earner.  
    
Local tax rate  Yes, proportional (average 20.24 %)  Yes, proportional (average 25.23 %) 
    
Interest expenses   Fully deductible against source 
income (e.g. imputed income from 
owner occupied housing). Deficits 
were deductible against earned 
income. 
Fully deductible against source income 
and deficits in source were deductible 
against earned income. If deductions 
exceeded earned income the residual 
amount could be deducted by the spouse. 




Yes, obtained from a progressive 
schedule as a function of the assessed 
value of the house.  
Yes, obtained from a progressive schedule 
as a function of the assessed value of the 
house. 
    
Deduction for 
local taxes paid 
the previous year 
Yes,
) , 16500 max( year previous taxes local SEK
 was deductible against ‘federal’ 
taxable income. 
No. 
    
Sickness insurance 
fee 
Yes, levied on earned income 
according to a non-linear schedule. 
Deductible against ‘federal’ taxable 
income.  
No, paid by the employer. 
    
Standard 
deduction 
Yes, SEK 16,500  for each spouse 
both in local and ‘federal’ taxation. 
Standard deduction not utilised by one 
spouse could be transferred to the 
other spouse. 
Yes, 23,100 for each spouse both in local 
and ‘federal’ taxation. Not transferable.  
    
Spousal tax 
reduction 
No.  Yes, the spousal tax reduction was 
) * 4 . 0 9250 , 0 max( AISE SEK   where 
AISE is assessed income of the secondary 
earner.  
    
Deduction for 
work 
Yes, SEK 2,200 for women without 
children in the 
household.
) 19800 , * 25 . 0 min( 2200 EIW   where 
EIW is earned income of the wife.  
Yes,  ) 10280 , * 2 . 0 min( EISE  where EISE 
is earned income of the secondary earner.  
    
Special tax 
reduction 
No.  Yes, amounts to SEK 1,300 if assessed 
income does not exceed SEK 36,000. 
Reduction rate 10 % between SEK 36,000 
and SEK 38,500. Requirement: assessed 
income must exceed the amount for the 
standard deduction. 
All monetary values are expressed in 2006 prices. Thus, the 1969 nominal values are multiplied with a factor 
7.34 and the 1975 values with 5.14.   36
 
 
A.2. Public transfers.  
Two public transfers are relevant to the studied population – housing allowances and child 
allowances. Both years, families were entitled to a housing allowance that was designed to 
compensate families for their housing costs. The basic structure of the allowance was that a 
maximum allowance first was computed as a function of the number of children in the family, 
housing quality (1969 only) and housing costs. Then the maximum allowance was reduced as 
a function of family income and family wealth two years ago (1967 and 1973).  Since register 
data are available only from 1968 and onwards housing allowances for 1969 have been 
computed based on income and wealth variables for 1968.  
During the period of study, housing allowances had two components, namely 
‘statskommunala bostadstillägg’, which was financed both by the ‘federal’ and local level and 
‘statliga bostadstillägg’, which was financed exclusively by the ‘federal’ level. The allowance 
rate for the former component varied at the local level. Here it is assumed that the allowance 
equalled the subsidy provided by the ‘federal’ level. Moreover, in the absence of information 
on housing costs I have assumed that all households face housing costs above the maximum 
limit. There were two major legislative changes with respect to housing allowances between 
1969 and 1975.  First, in 1969, but not in 1975, full allowance required that the dwelling 
exhibited a set of attributes. Information on housing quality is available in the 1970 censuses. 
Second, families without children were eligible to housing allowances in 1975 but not in 
1969. 
The second transfer system, child allowances, was both years designed as a lump sum 
transfer for each child below 16 years of age in the household. In 1969 the transfer amounted 
to SEK 6,600 per child and in 1975 to SEK 8,740 per child. 
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Appendix B. Distribution of work hours last week in 1968 and 1974.  
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  1969 1975 
    
Employment status  0.647  0.791 
 (0.478)  (0.407) 
    
Log net-of-tax share (40 hours)  -0.918  -0.835 
 (0.102)  (0.034) 
    
Log net-of-tax share (30 hours)  -0.891  -0.782 
 (0.124)  (0.024) 
    
Log net-of-tax share (20 hours)  -0.851  -0.747 
 (0.161)  (0.013) 
    
Non-labor income   163.393  148.544 
 (49.789)  (34.368) 
    
Pre-school children  0.561  0.239 
 (0.763)  (0.529) 
    
Shool children  0.799  0.821 
 (0.880)  (0.897) 
    
Age 36.739  42.739 
 (7.026)  (7.026) 
    
Local day care density (%)  10.365  19.953 
 (6.899)  (10.160) 
    
6 years of schooling  0.661  0.661 
 (0.473)  (0.473) 
    
9 years of schooling  0.265  0.265 
 (0.442)  (0.442) 
    
More than 9 years of schooling  0.074  0.074 
 (0.261)  (0.261) 
    
# observations  18069  18069 
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